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Abstract 
In Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong develops what is perhaps the most comprehensive 
defense of the consensus model of public reason – a model which incorporates both a public-reasons-only 
requirement and an accessibility requirement framed in terms of shared evaluative standards. While the 
consensus model arguably predominates amongst public reason liberals, it is criticized by convergence 
theorists who reject both the public-reasons-only requirement and the accessibility requirement. In this 
paper, I argue that while we have good reason to reject Quong’s call for a public-reasons-only 
requirement, all public reason liberals should endorse at least some shared evaluative standards and, 
hence, an accessibility requirement.  
 
Public reason liberals hold that if a coercive law is to have legitimate authority over citizens, 
then each citizen subject to the law must have sufficient reason to agree to the law.1 For public 
reason liberals, this is what it means to justify a law to a free and equal citizen. But there is a 
divide amongst public reason liberals regarding what sorts of reasons ought to be permitted to 
enter into this justification process. Those who endorse a consensus theory of public reason 
argue that only public (or “shared”) reasons can serve to justify coercive laws. Public reasons are 
reasons that are not grounded in one’s personal comprehensive moral, philosophical, or religious 
conceptions. They are the sort of reasons that, ideally, anyone could agree to regardless of one’s 
personal comprehensive doctrines. Those who endorse a convergence theory of public reason 
argue that non-public reasons should also have a place in the justificatory process despite the fact 
that such reasons are grounded in one’s personal comprehensive doctrines and, as such, may not 
be shared by one’s fellow citizens. The debate between consensus and convergence theorists 
within public reason liberalism is an important one. For if the consensus view is correct, and only 
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 Different theorists propose different sorts of caveats on this, some of which will be discussed below. 
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public reasons can underwrite the justification of a coercive law, then this insight generates a 
significant moral constraint on the sorts of reasons citizens may invoke when advocating for a 
coercive law or even simply agreeing to such a law. This constraint is moral in nature since, 
according to one influential argument, advocating for or agreeing to coercive laws solely on the 
basis of non-public reasons constitutes a failure to respect one’s fellow citizens as free and equal. 
In this paper I defend a soft convergence model of public reason. Like other convergence 
models of public reason, the soft convergence model rejects the claim that only public reasons 
carry justificatory weight when considering whether a coercive policy or law is publicly justified. 
However, unlike other convergence models of public reason, the soft convergence model 
incorporates an accessibility requirement, one which dictates that for a reason to qualify as 
justificatory, it must satisfy at least some shared (agent-neutral) evaluative standards 
(specifically, shared standards of inference and shared standards of evidence). Given that 
consensus models of public reason incorporate both a public-reasons-only requirement and an 
accessibility requirement, the soft convergence model is best understood as occupying a viable 
middle ground between standard consensus and standard convergence models of public reason. 
 I begin in §1 by briefly clarifying the distinction between consensus and convergence 
models of public reason so as to highlight the central point of disagreement between the two 
models. In §2 and §3, I argue against the claim that a public-reasons-only restriction should be 
appended to a requirement of public justification. In §2, I take as my focal point Jonathan 
Quong’s recent defense of the consensus model in which it is argued that public reason 
liberalism must incorporate a public-reasons-only restriction because it must incorporate a 
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sincerity requirement.2 I contend that even if it is the case that public reason liberalism must 
incorporate some form of a sincerity requirement, it does not follow that such a requirement is 
robust enough to ground a public-reasons-only restriction.3 In §3, I argue that some consensus 
theorists have been prone to morally conflating the political practices of agreeing to a policy, 
proposing (or advocating for) a policy, and demanding that others adhere to a policy. This 
conflation may help to explain why some public reason liberals reach for a public-reasons-only 
restriction. In §4, I look to demarcate the soft convergence model of public reason from 
alternative convergence models by motivating the adoption of an accessibility requirement. On 
my view, public reason liberals should accept that there are at least some shared evaluative 
standards (namely, standards of inference and evidence). If this is right, then convergence 
theorists should favor some version of an accessibility requirement in place of other recently-
proposed alternatives, such as the less-restrictive intelligibility requirement. 
 One important qualification regarding the breadth of the ensuing claims is in order. My 
focus is on citizens who are not official agents of the state. Moreover, the particular question that 
I grapple with is this: do citizens fail to respect each other when they merely advocate for or 
agree to coercive laws on the basis of non-public reasons that others may not be able to accept? 
This is important since one might maintain that the obligations of officials diverge in some 
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 Micah Schwartzman is another leading defender of a principle of sincerity. Schwartzman, however, explicitly 
assumes that public justification requires public reasons and points readers to Quong’s arguments for a preliminary 
defense of that assumption (2011, pp. 378, 386 fn. 33).  
3
 As discussed in §2, Quong’s advocacy for a public-reasons-only (PRO) restriction is ultimately based on an 
argument from respect for persons. However, other consensus theorists have argued for a PRO restriction on 
different grounds. Perhaps the most popular alternative approach is to attempt to ground a PRO restriction in 
concerns for stability or harmony. Eberle (2002, pp. 152-186) provides an admirable account of the challenges faced 
by such an approach. See Weithman (2010) and Hadfield and Macedo (2012) for recent developments of the 
approach along with related criticisms advanced by Thrasher and Vallier (2015), Kogelmann and Stich (2016), 
Billingham (2016), and Pallikkathayil (2017). 
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respects from the obligations of citizens. I will elaborate further on this qualification in the 
concluding remarks. 
 
1 Framing the Debate 
It is the endorsement of a requirement of public justification that most clearly demarcates public 
reason liberalism from other versions of liberalism. While the precise demands of a requirement 
of public justification will vary from one public reason liberal to another, a generic requirement 
of public justification roughly states that a coercive law is justified only when each individual 
subject to the law has sufficient reason to agree to the law.
4
 
 The debate between consensus and convergence theories of public reason is a debate 
about what sorts of reasons can enter into the justificatory domain. Consensus models of public 
reason endorse a public-reasons-only (PRO) requirement, while convergence models of public 
reason reject the PRO requirement. Public reasons are often described as “shared” reasons: they 
are not grounded in one’s personal comprehensive moral, philosophical, or religious conceptions, 
but are instead acceptable to all no matter what personal comprehensive doctrines one endorses.5  
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 This formulation is intentionally broad and underdeveloped in order to take account of the fact that public reason 
liberals of various stripes qualify the constituent elements of such a requirement in various ways. For example, for 
Rawls, only constitutional essentials and other matters of basic justice would fall within the scope of a requirement 
of public justification (1996, p. 137). Moreover, while Rawls expects these instruments to be justified only to 
rational individuals, other theorists may idealize members of the public in alternative ways. My intention is not to 
engage in these related debates here, but only to make a claim about what types of reasons should be permitted to 
count as justificatory reasons whatever one’s view is regarding how individual members of the public should be 
idealized (if at all) or what sorts of coercive instruments should fall within the scope of such a requirement. For 
other generic formulations of such a requirement see Gaus (2010, p. 21), Vallier (2014, p. 24), and Pallikkathayil 
(2017, p. 413). 
5
 Public reason is the view that the rules and principles that govern our social and political life are to be rationally 
justifiable (on the basis of reasons) to all citizens subjected to them. Of course, what it means for social and political 
principles to be rationally justifiable to all needs explanation. While some accounts of public reason incorporate the 
notion of “public” or “shared” reasons, public reason (the view) does not require that reasons be “public.” As such, 
one might defend an account of public reason without appeal to “public” reasons or, at any rate, without an 
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I will refer to reasons based in one’s personal comprehensive doctrines as non-public reasons. 
These reasons are not necessarily private, since others may in fact accept them. Yet, non-public 
reasons do not transcend all comprehensive doctrines, hence they should not be considered 
public. To adopt the PRO requirement – as consensus theorists do – is to hold that only public 
reasons may ground an individual’s acceptance or endorsement of some proposed coercive law. 
 Importantly, the convergence model does not require that for a law to be publicly 
justified that all citizens must agree to the law on the basis of non-public reasons. To the 
contrary, convergence models merely allow for citizens to agree to or endorse laws on the basis 
of non-public reasons, but they may certainly also agree to or endorse them on the basis of public 
reasons.  
 I have provided here only a coarse-grained distinction between consensus and 
convergence models of public reason. As I have remarked, there are some other differences, but 
they are not crucial to drawing the distinction at hand. For example, consensus theorists adopt an 
accessibility requirement along with the PRO requirement while convergence theorists have thus 
far rejected both. But, as I will argue below, while there is good reason to abandon the PRO 
restriction, convergence theorists should retain the accessibility requirement.  
 
2 Against the Public-Reasons-Only (PRO) Restriction 
If the debate between consensus and convergence theorists is primarily a debate about whether 
public reason liberalism should incorporate a PRO restriction, then one needs to take a stance on 
this issue prior to developing one’s more nuanced and particular version of either the consensus 
 
exclusive appeal to public reasons (Cf. Freeman 2007, p. 385). That is, public reason with non-public reasons 
remains a possibility. 
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or convergence model. Since Jonathan Quong has recently constructed what is arguably the most 
sustained and complete defense of the consensus model, I will take as my focus his argument in 
favor of the PRO restriction. Given that the PRO restriction supplements a requirement of public 
justification, my aim is to defend the convergence model by arguing that Quong’s case for such 
supplementation is unconvincing.  
 Quong argues that public reason liberalism must incorporate a sincerity requirement 
(2011, p. 265). The sincerity requirement dictates that “[w]e should sincerely think that our view 
of the [political] matter is based on political values everyone can be reasonably expected to 
endorse” (Rawls 1996, 241). Quong understands this to mean that we cannot “merely aim at 
getting others to assent to our proposal, we must sincerely believe our proposal can be justified 
to them” (2011, p. 265). This prompts Quong to construct the following principle of sincerity: 
A principle of justificatory sincerity (PJS) requires that A may only endorse X if the 
following are true (and vice versa for B):  
1. A reasonably believes he is justified in endorsing X. 
2. A reasonably believes that B is justified in endorsing X 
Furthermore, following Rawls’s duty of civility, 
3. A may only (in the political domain) offer arguments in favour of X to B that he 
reasonably believes B would be justified in accepting. (p. 266) 
Quong asserts that PJS “undermines the convergence view of public reason” (2011, p. 
266). His critical move is to argue that the only way we can sincerely believe others are justified 
in endorsing our proposals is if those proposals are grounded solely in public reasons. As such, it 
is condition two in particular that summons the PRO restriction (pp. 266-267). The general 
assertion, then, is that public reason liberalism must incorporate a PRO restriction because it 
must incorporate a sincerity requirement. Given this, two strategies are immediately available to 
dissenters. First, one might argue that a sincerity requirement is not a requirement of public 
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reason liberalism, thus a PRO restriction cannot be appealed to on such grounds. Second, one 
might argue that even if some form of a sincerity requirement is necessary, such a requirement 
does not call for a PRO restriction. It is this second approach that I will adopt. 
Quong maintains that the sincerity requirement has two important functions. First, it 
“helps to distinguish public reason from rhetoric and manipulation.” Second, “it is also important 
due to the role it plays in sustaining… the value of civic friendship or respect.” For A to be in a 
state of civic friendship with B is for A and B to respect “each other as free and equal citizens” 
(Quong 2011, p. 265). On Quong’s account, then, a principle of sincerity – a principle that is 
satisfied only when we sincerely believe that others can accept the (public) reasons we offer in 
favor of our preferred positions – is necessary to respecting each other as free and equal citizens 
and, hence, is necessary for civic friendship (pp. 265-266).  
I maintain that Quong’s position is too strong. Offering public reasons is not a necessary 
condition of respecting each other as free and equal citizens. While it may be true that satisfying 
Quong’s principle (the second condition in particular) – and hence only offering public reasons – 
will increase the probability that public deliberation furnishes agreement (call this this practical 
claim), Quong thinks the claim that ultimately undercuts the convergence model is a moral 
claim. He believes that offering non-public reasons constitutes a failure to respect one’s fellow 
citizens as free and equal. The idea is this: A fails to respect B as free and equal when A argues 
on behalf of p and it is the case that A is not in the epistemic position to sincerely believe that B 
can accept the reason(s) in favor of p that he or she offers to B. But, according to Quong, A 
cannot be in the epistemic position to sincerely believe that B can accept the reason(s) in favor of 
p unless those reasons are public (Quong 2011, p. 267). Quong, however, does not adequately 
explain how a failure to be in such an epistemic position has the significant moral consequences 
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that he attributes to it. A is not coercing B. A is not even demanding that B act in accordance 
with A’s proposal. Rather, A, as a free and equal being herself, is merely presenting an argument 
for why she thinks a proposal should be accepted. In other words, she is simply expressing the 
very considerations that shape her own agency. It remains unclear why such an act should be 
construed as an instance of A failing to respect B as a free and equal citizen.6  
On the face of it, it appears that consensus theorists have traditionally run together two 
different political practices that should be carefully delineated: (1) the practice of A proposing a 
policy to B; and (2) the practice of A demanding that B adhere to some policy. As Nicholas 
Wolterstorff has noted, the public reason liberal may think that “to advocate for some proposed 
piece of legislation is thus, implicitly if not explicitly, to place a moral demand on one’s fellow 
citizens” (2012, p. 60). If the consensus theorist does intend to deny that there is any morally-
relevant difference between proposing a policy and demanding that others adhere to it, then we 
need a less-puzzling account of how A’s proposing a policy to B amounts to A’s demanding that 
B adhere to that policy.  
What is perhaps morally problematic about a case of one person, Ari, demanding that 
another, Sky, adhere to some policy (without consideration for whether Sky has a sufficient 
reason, even counterfactually, to agree to that policy) is that Ari does not care that Sky is, to 
borrow a phrase from Thomas Scanlon, “a locus of reasons” (1998, p. 105) – he merely wants to 
claim authority over her agency. This, then, is an instance in which it might plausibly be argued 
that Ari fails to respect Sky as a free and equal citizen.7 But no such degree of disrespect occurs 
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 I will set aside momentarily worries about manipulation, but will address that concern towards the end of this 
section. 
7
 If the mere act of demanding falls short of an act of coercion unless the demand is backed by force or the threat of 
future harm, one might dispute the idea that an act of mere demanding constitutes a failure to treat another as free 
and equal. I shall nevertheless proceed as if there is at least something morally problematic with the practice. For if 
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when Ari merely argues on behalf of a policy – i.e., when he elucidates the reason(s) he has to 
endorse some particular policy.8 To propose or advocate for a policy – even one in which others 
do not have sufficient reason to agree to – is neither to impinge on their free and equal status nor 
to fail to recognize them as a locus of reasons. When Ari advocates on behalf of a policy, he 
publicizes what he takes to be a worthwhile argument for the policy. Not only does this not 
amount to any sort of obstruction of agency, but it has the virtue of bringing into the public Ari’s 
genuine (we suppose) feelings about the matter. As Brian Carey argues, the admission of non-
public reason into public debate may actually increase participation in public deliberation and 
“yield more stable agreements” (Carey 2018, p. 52).9 
 It should be emphasized that public reason liberals, in recognizing citizens to be free and 
equal, argue that citizens have defeater power. Citizens are free insofar as they are not naturally 
subject to the authority of others; and they are equal to one another with regard to their free 
status (Quong 2013; Gaus 2007, p. 90). As such, if a citizen does not have sufficient reason – 
even counterfactually – to endorse some proposal, then absent the citizen’s consent, the proposal 
is defeated.10 In light of this, when I propose reasons, even those grounded in personal 
comprehensive doctrines, I am not engaged in any sort of moral imposition. The structure of a 
requirement of public justification protects against such an imposition. In acknowledging that 
 
the offering of non-public reasons does not amount to demanding – much less coercion – then the claim that offering 
non-public reasons is morally problematic appears implausible. 
8
 Such an act may even encourage B to reflect upon his or her own reasons. 
9
 Kogelmann and Stich (2016) also argue that permitting citizens to appeal to non-public reasons may promote 
stability. 
10
 We must be careful not to construe a requirement of public justification as requiring both unanimous and actual 
consent. Public reason liberals drop the actual consent requirement in favor of the unanimity requirement, though 
they certainly disagree regarding the scope of such a requirement (i.e., should it apply only at the constitutional 
level, or apply to everyday laws as well?). Public reason liberals typically invoke the unanimity requirement when 
noting that coercive laws (or at least a certain subset of them) must be “endorsed by the reasons of all” (Gaus 2011, 
pp. xv-xvi; Cf. Rawls 1996, p. 137). 
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each of my fellow citizens is free and equal and a locus of reasons, I recognize that they have 
defeater power. If this is right, then it makes sense to argue from personal comprehensive 
doctrines when one is unsure about how widespread his or her comprehensive views are. After 
all, sharing one’s arguments may benefit the political process when either (1) those sharing 
similar comprehensive views realize that they have good reasons to support a particular proposal; 
or (2) one’s arguments based on comprehensive views are shown to be poorly constructed.11 
 Still, the consensus theorist’s emphasis on sincerity has its place. Let us suppose that Ari 
is advocating for p. Suppose further that, when confronted with Sky’s skepticism, Ari argues that 
Sky’s existing beliefs, when coupled with one or more essential inferences, commits Sky to 
endorsing p. But now imagine that Sky’s beliefs are poorly-formed and the inferences that Sky 
would need to make are invalid inferences. Suppose further that Ari recognizes all of this, and 
thus recognizes that Sky does not have sufficient reason to endorse p, but nevertheless continues 
to press his line of reasoning to Sky. This sort of case captures the consensus theorist’s worries 
about manipulation. Ari is not treating Sky as a locus of reasons. Rather, Ari merely views Sky 
as someone to be persuaded by any means necessary.  Although this case captures genuine 
normative concerns regarding the role of sincerity, cases of this type cannot ground the sort of 
robust sincerity requirement that Quong is after for they cannot ground a PRO restriction. 
Manipulation is not a practice that is uniquely (or even necessarily) tied to non-public reasons.12 
As such, an anti-manipulation requirement does not call for a PRO restriction. Once more, then, 
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 (1) is the result of what Gaus calls “the division of epistemic labor” (2010 p. 26). The idea is that Sara may justify 
p to Jack on the basis of religious reasons, while Sal justifies p to Becky on the basis of considerations found, for 
example, in the writings of Kant. Others may appeal to religious reasons that are different than those offered by 
Sara, while yet others may appeal to the works of John Stuart Mill, James Madison, and so on. Gaus’ point is that 
“many different reasons from many different perspectives may converge” together – the end result of a division of 
epistemic labor – in order to justify p (2010, p. 26). 
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 Moreover, it is doubtful that any consensus theorist would say that any instance of Ari’s offering of a non-public 
reason for consideration by Sky constitutes Ari’s deliberate manipulation of Sky. 
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the concern is that Quong has not adequately explained why one must be in the epistemic 
position of sincerely believing that others can accept R for p in order to avoid failing to treat 
them as free and equal. If we set aside instances of deliberate manipulation, my not being in such 
an epistemic state plausibly provides me with a reason to publicize my argument – not to 
withhold it.13 
 While I do not deny that there may be a place in public reason liberalism for a 
requirement of sincerity, I claim that such a requirement is weaker than Quong contends. 
Importantly, such a requirement does not appear to implicate a PRO restriction. When arguing 
from comprehensive views, it is not evident that any moral harm is done so long as the relevant 
legislative proposal is not simply imposed on one’s fellow citizens and so long as one is not 
resorting to mere manipulation.  
I am not alone in denying that an individual necessarily fails to respect his fellow citizens 
when he advocates for a coercive law that he cannot sincerely believe all others have sufficient 
reason to endorse.14 Christopher Eberle argues that it is a mistake to ground a doctrine of 
religious restraint (essentially a narrow version of the PRO restriction) in the claim that failure to 
adhere to such a doctrine amounts to a failure to respect others (2009, p. 152). According to 
Eberle, what is required of citizens and officials is that they adhere to the “ideal of conscientious 
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 To be sure, Rawls and other consensus theorists do provide space for citizens to express their genuine 
comprehensive beliefs. For example, Rawls’ famous proviso says that we may “introduce into political discussion at 
any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give properly 
public reason to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support” (Rawls 1999, p. 
144). It is unusual that the proviso is not objected to on the grounds that it allows for citizens to engage in insincere 
argumentation (as Quong would construe it). Perhaps it is the case that the “in due course” condition staves off such 
an objection. But it is not obvious that it should (from the perspective of consensus theorists that is). After all, if P 
does not have public reasons to offer at time t1, why think P can sincerely claim that he or she will have them at t2 
(Audi 2011, p. 64)? If P has no reasonable grounds for believing that public reasons will become available, then 
Quong’s argument, if it is right, would show that Rawls’ proviso allows for citizens to disrespect one another in a 
way that consensus theorists want to eliminate. 
14
 In addition to the following discussion of Eberle’s position, see North (2012). 
12 
 
engagement” – i.e., they should sincerely attempt to construct persuasive arguments in support of 
those coercive laws which they advocate for (2009, pp. 167-168).15 Eberle believes that one 
needs an overly “thick” conception of what is required to show respect for others in order to 
claim that any citizen who is thoughtful and genuine in developing her arguments – even if those 
arguments rely solely on religious reasons – is guilty of failing to respect her fellow citizens (see 
Eberle’s case of the Agapic Pacifist: 2009, pp. 152ff.). However, it does not appear that Eberle 
makes his case strictly in the context of a requirement of public justification. As such, he is not 
working under the assumption that each citizen has defeater power. In this respect, Eberle’s 
argument is much more ambitious than mine.16 If one departs from a requirement of public 
justification (which incorporates a unanimity requirement) in favor of, for example, a simple 
majority rule, then new complications will indeed arise as a result of the rule’s unique 
characteristics.17 Such complications may require reconsidering the case for a PRO requirement. 
 
3 Distinguishing Political Practices 
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 We might add that the conscientious engager will acknowledge that the arguments which he or she finds 
reasonably persuasive may differ from the arguments which others find reasonably persuasive. I thank Eric Mack for 
this point. 
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 For a criticism of Eberle’s argument, see Boettcher (2012, pp. 171ff). 
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 For example, within the context of a majoritarian system, the majority can limit the freedoms of certain minority 
groups (with some constitutional restrictions). These cases are especially problematic when the reasons offered by 
the majority are often rooted in comprehensive beliefs. Consider, for example, the same-sex marriage debate in the 
U.S, where some states have, in the past, put the issue to public vote. Within a majoritarian system, do those who 
support a ban on same-sex marriages disrespect (in a morally salient way) same-sex couples when it is known that 
same-sex couples cannot support such a law and, moreover, that such a law causes same-sex couples significant 
emotional distress? The case for answering in the positive has to be stronger within the context of the majoritarian 
system than it is in a system that endorses a public justification requirement. After all, in the former, the subjects to 
be coerced – same-sex couples – are at the mercy of the beliefs of the majority – who are not restricted from 
appealing to their comprehensive views – whether reasonable or not. But even here, a ban on non-public reasons 
serves as an ad hoc patch for the undesirable consequences of a majoritarian system. 
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As explained in §2, a defense of a robust principle of sincerity may provoke consensus theorists 
to run together two different political practices: the practice of A demanding that B adhere to 
some policy and the practice of A proposing a policy to B. However, some public reasons 
liberals have also supposed that there is no morally-relevant difference between one agreeing to 
(or endorsing) a policy and one proposing (or advocating for) a policy. When this claim is united 
with the claim that there is no morally-relevant difference between proposing a policy and 
demanding that others adhere to that policy, it yields the corollary that there is no morally-
relevant difference between my agreeing to a policy and my demanding that others adhere to that 
policy. The consequence is that some public reason liberals have been prone to treat the practice 
of agreeing to a policy as morally on par with the practice of demanding that others adhere to 
that policy. For Rawls, this conflation begins with the claim that “the ideal of public reason does 
hold for citizens when they engage in political advocacy in the public forum… [and] holds 
equally for how citizens are to vote in elections when constitutional essentials and matters of 
basic justice are at stake” (Rawls 1996, p. 215). As Samuel Freeman has commented in 
discussing Rawls’ view: 
Public reason requires that when citizens vote in elections when matters of constitutional 
justice and basic justice are at stake, then, if they vote according to their comprehensive 
views, their vote must at least be compatible with the political values of public reason. 
There must be reasons of justice and political values of public reason that support their 
decision if they are to vote fairly and legitimately. Otherwise citizens violate the duty of 
civility. (Freeman 2007, p. 386)  
On this view, to vote for a law that cannot be justified to others is to disrespect others. As 
such, the robust version of the principle of sincerity (and, hence, the PRO restriction) is said to 
hold even when merely selecting policies that will have jurisdiction over others. As Boettcher 
emphasizes, “liberal-democratic citizens also disrespect their compatriots when they attempt 
through voting or other advocacy in the public political forum to settle constitutional questions 
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solely on the basis of religious doctrine” (2012, pp. 172-173). Our problem remains: it takes an 
exceedingly thick conception of what is required to show respect for others in order to claim that 
the act of registering one’s genuine preferences necessarily entails disrespecting one’s fellow 
citizens in some morally salient way.18 It is true, as Rawls remarked, that “[w]e recognize that 
our own [comprehensive] doctrine has, and can have, for people generally, no special claim on 
them beyond their own view of its merits” (Rawls 1996, p. 60). As such, perhaps I cannot 
demand that you accept p on the basis of my comprehensive beliefs when you do not have 
sufficient reason to accept those beliefs. But it does not follow from this that I cannot agree to p 
on the basis of such beliefs without disrespecting you. 
 When one morally conflates the political practices of agreeing, proposing, and 
demanding, it leads to some perplexing and unfortunate circumstances. For example, let us 
suppose that Sky agrees to p on the basis of comprehensive reason Rc. Let us suppose further that 
a vote is taken to determine whether p is publicly justified. According to the standard consensus 
approach, Sky fails to respect her fellow citizens as free and equal so long as she votes in favor 
of p solely (or even substantially) on the basis of Rc. But notice the unusual implication that 
follows. The consensus theorist must say to Sky: “I know you agree to p, but I cannot let that 
stand. You must agree to p for the reasons that I have deemed permissible.” Assuming that p is in 
fact agreed to by all citizens, the public reason liberal undercuts the public justification of p by 
insisting that the PRO restriction applies to the political practice of agreeing to policies. If, as I 
have argued, the robust version of the principle of sincerity should be rejected in favor the 
weaker version, then the weaker version has no jurisdiction over the political practice of agreeing 
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justified. I take A’s voting in favor of p to be an instance of A registering, through a political mechanism, her 
agreement with p. 
15 
 
to policies. Instead, the principle of sincerity only applies in deliberative situations between two 
or more parties in which at least one party intentionally seeks to manipulate another.19  
   
4 Shared Evaluative Standards 
The PRO restriction is not the only restriction that consensus theorists place on citizens. In 
addition to the PRO restriction, consensus theorists also endorse an accessibility requirement 
which dictates that for a reason to qualify as justificatory, it must satisfy at least some shared 
(agent-neutral) evaluative standards. Evaluative standards are what Rawls referred to as 
“guidelines of inquiry” – the “principles of reasoning and rules of evidence…” (Rawls 1996, pp. 
223-224).20 These are the principles and rules that one appeals to when determining (a) whether a 
reason supports a particular claim; and (b) whether the reason itself is well grounded.  
 Convergence theorists, such as Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier, reject both the 
accessibility requirement and the PRO restriction.  However, a convergence theorist might 
endorse the accessibility requirement while rejecting the PRO restriction. Importantly, it is not 
the condition of requiring shared evaluative standards that limits justificatory reasons to public 
reasons. Some reasons may be public, but not satisfy the accessibility requirement. Alternatively, 
there may be non-public reasons that do satisfy the accessibility requirement. As such, the 
requirement of shared evaluative standards is independent of the PRO restriction. 
But why think public reason liberalism needs an accessibility requirement? One worry is 
that if there are no shared standards of reasoning and evidence, then our judgments about 
                                                          
19
 Perhaps the scope of the principle would also cover cases in which A deliberately misrepresents his beliefs to B, 
yet (for whatever reason) does not intend to manipulate B. 
20
 Freeman has framed Rawls’ guidelines of inquiry as the “formal and procedural rules of argumentation and 
justification, including shared standards of evidence and reasoning (rules and standards of inference in deductive, 
inductive, and probabilistic reasoning, for example)” (Freeman 2007, p. 387). 
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whether a reason qualifies as sufficient will be drastically and adversely impacted. Let us 
consider an example. Suppose that society S seeks to institute a law that prohibits littering in 
public places. But let us  also suppose that citizen C rejects the law on the basis that he believes 
that littering (1) tends to improve property values; (2) is good for the environment; and (3) never 
poses a danger to individuals (no matter the substance of the litter). The crucial question is this: 
does C have a sufficient reason to reject the law (alternatively, does C possess a defeater that 
undermines the claim that C has a sufficient reason to accept the law)?  
In normal circumstances, we might reasonably expect that those engaging C would call 
on him to provide evidence in support of his claims. We might also expect that those engaging C 
would require him to appeal to accepted standards of evidence. As such, if C were to say that his 
claims were based on mere intuitions, then we should not be surprised if his fellow citizens 
found his claims to be poorly supported. Assuming a good argument has been furnished on 
behalf of the law, and assuming that C’s present claims are his only potential defeaters, then C’s 
fellow citizens may continue to insist that C has a sufficient reason to agree to the law. 
Importantly, it is not the case that C must in fact agree to the law, but rather that (moderately) 
idealized C would find reason(s) to agree. It is arguably the case that acceptable levels of 
idealization would lead actual C to recognize that his claims rely on overly-weak standards of 
evidence. 
If one rejects the accessibility requirement, then this sort of response to C is unacceptable 
since to reject the accessibility requirement is to reject the claim that standards of reasoning and 
evidence have some agent-neutral basis.21 But if such standards do not have an agent-neutral 
                                                          
21
 Some standards will arguably be society dependent (Tyndal 2016). I leave open the question of which, if any, 
standards could properly be construed as transcending societal norms, and hence be agent-neutral in a more robust 
sense. 
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basis, then barring an explanation to the contrary, any criticism of C’s standards is unwarranted.22 
Consequently, one would have to say that C – even idealized C – does possess a defeater reason. 
If so, it would be morally wrong to impose the law in question on C. 
Identifying what the evaluative standards are is an additional and cumbersome challenge. 
Freeman has suggested that 
settled scientific theories with standards of evidence generally accepted by experts in their 
fields are admissible within public reason. When they are relevant, Rawls would then 
accept as admissible within public reason (for example) genetic theory, the theory of 
relativity, and neo-classical price theory in economics, and even neo-Darwinian theory of 
natural selection. The latter suggests that being shared by a majority of citizens generally is 
not a necessary feature of public reason (since Darwinism is not accepted by a majority in 
the U.S.); public reason thus can include some reasons that are not shared among citizens 
on the basis of their comprehensive views. (Freeman 2007, p. 387)23 
For the consensus theorist, the accessibility requirement functions as a constraint 
mechanism alongside the PRO restriction. According to the standard consensus model, only 
reasons based on shared political values can enter into the pool of reasons that are potential 
justificatory reasons (hence the PRO restriction). However, as Rawls stresses, without guidelines 
of inquiry – i.e., without shared evaluative standards – “substantive principles cannot be applied” 
(Rawls 1996, p. 223).24  
As for convergence theorists, whether one endorses or rejects the accessibility 
requirement has significant ramifications for one’s account of public reason liberalism. Let us 
look at another example of what sorts of reasons could be appealed to on a convergence model if 
                                                          
22
 As elaborated below, one may have standing to criticize some of C’s epistemic holdings on the basis of C’s own 
evaluative standards. 
23
 Freeman’s last point is important. Though public reasons are often described as “shared,” it is not the case that all 
public reasons will in fact be shared by all actual citizens. Even more, that R is in fact shared by all actual citizens is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for that reason being considered “public.”  
24
 When deliberating about some particular law L, the mere fact that a reason R is based on one or more shared 
political values does not necessarily make R a good or sufficient reason for L. 
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the accessibility requirement were rejected. Vallier is a convergence theorist who construes 
evaluative standards as agent-relative and hence rejects the notion of shared evaluative standards 
(2014, p. 107). This allows for divine revelation, for example, to be considered a legitimate 
evaluative standard. Even more, contradictory standards of divine revelation are said to be 
equally legitimate. So, the Christian’s standard of divine revelation is as legitimate as the 
Muslim’s standard. According to Vallier, it is permissible for “reasons supported by one of these 
agent-relative evaluative standards alone to figure into a public justification for a law” (2014, p. 
107).  
It does not follow from this that Vallier does not impose any sort of restriction 
whatsoever on the sorts of reasons that may be appealed to. To the contrary, he endorses an 
intelligibility requirement in which “A’s reason RA can figure into a justification for (or rejection 
of) a coercive law L only if it is intelligible to all members of the public” (Vallier 2014, p. 106). 
Moreover, “A’s reason RA is intelligible for members of the public if and only if members of the 
public regard RA as epistemically justified for A according to A’s evaluative standards” (Vallier 
2014, p. 106). So, it is perfectly acceptable for the religious citizen to appeal to reasons based on 
divine revelation as long as those reasons are intelligible to all others in light of the religious 
citizen’s acceptance of divine revelation.  
Framed as such, the intelligibility requirement is ambiguous. On the one hand, one might 
reject the idea of shared standards of evidence, but endorse the notion of shared standards of 
inference. But if there are no shared standards of evidence, then even if one draws valid 
inferences, some positions that one reaches will clearly be unjustified. For example, on the 
approach under consideration, one does not criticize P for believing that a pack of unicorns has 
formed a colony on the summit of Mt. Everest. One only criticizes the way P makes inferences 
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based on that belief. On the other hand, if all evaluative standards are to be seen as agent-
relative, then different individuals can also have different standards of inference. On this 
approach, it would follow that S can criticize P’s beliefs and inferences only if P has not adhered 
to his or her own standards.  
On the issue of whether Vallier endorses the weaker or the stronger of the two positions, 
the clearest passage we get is this: 
[i]f I cannot see your purported reasons as reasons for you even according to your own 
evaluative standards, then I cannot reason from your standpoint by definition. That said, 
intelligibility might deny justificatory status to reasons based on poor inferences and bad 
information, as it requires that justificatory reasons possess epistemic justification. (Vallier 
2014, p. 107). 
But once again, are so-called “poor inferences” poor because they fail to meet some 
agent-neutral standard; or, are they poor because the appropriate agent-relative standard was 
improperly applied? If Vallier intends to endorse agent-neutral standards of inference, but agent-
relative standards of evidence, then an argument needs to be offered for why the two types of 
evaluative standards can permit dissimilar evaluative criteria. Otherwise, it is plausibly the case 
that any argument in favor of agent-neutral standards of inference will undercut any claim to 
agent-relative standards of evidence.25 The worry, then, is that the intelligibility requirement is 
too weak; some comprehensive views may have to be deemed unjustified on the basis of agent-
neutral evaluative standards.26 
                                                          
25
 Vallier clarifies that the intelligibility requirement does not require shared evaluative standards (2014, p. 124). 
But this of course means that it could permit them. What makes Vallier’s position unsettling is that he maintains that 
his view does not require any shared evaluative standards, yet he implies that, as a contingent matter, it will be the 
case that at least some standards are shared (particularly standards of inference). Yet, given the commitments of his 
view, it must be the case that if a citizen does not recognize, for example, the rule of modus ponens, then that citizen 
cannot be expected to reason in accordance with that rule. 
26
 Quong argues that “[a]rguments and reasons may be intelligible without being justifiable, and thus merely seeing 
someone else’s position as intelligible does not entail that one must see that other person’s position as justifiable” 
(2011, p. 270 fn. 42). 
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 A rejection of the intelligibility requirement need not drive us to the consensus model. 
This is partly because I doubt that the PRO restriction does any worthwhile work beyond the 
work that is already done by the accessibility requirement. After all, if one’s comprehensive 
views meet shared standards of evidence and inference, then what is the point of further 
requiring that one’s reasons be public?27 The consensus approach, then, appears to be too strong. 
 There is a viable middle ground to be defended, one that entails a rejection of the PRO 
restriction but an endorsement of shared standards of evidence and inference. As I have implied, 
an endorsement of shared evaluative standards is frequently associated with a notion of 
accessibility. While accessibility might be understood in a variety of ways, I take P’s reason R to 
be accessible if and only if R (including P’s rationale for R) is supported by shared evaluative 
standards (Cf. Vallier 2011a, p. 369; 2014, p. 108). Moreover, R must be accessible in order for 
it to play a justificatory role with regard to legislative proposals. This notion of accessibility will 
clearly restrict what sorts of reasons can count as justificatory reasons – reasons that can be 
appealed to in order to justify (or defeat) a particular proposal.28   
The accessibility requirement is widely-discussed in the public reason literature. 
Importantly, while it has traditionally been associated with consensus models of public reason,29 
                                                          
27
 The issue is further complicated if it is the case that we cannot clearly distinguish between comprehensive and 
non-comprehensive doctrines (for a discussion of this worry, see Gaus 2003b, p. 180ff.; also Gaus 2004). Perhaps, 
then, what we should be most concerned with is whether our reasons and arguments meet certain standards of 
evidence and inference. 
28
 I assume, for now, that there is a symmetry between the epistemic standards that apply to the practice of agreeing 
to a proposal and the epistemic standards that apply to the practice of rejecting a proposal – namely, both practices 
are subject to the accessibility requirement. However, symmetry claims are controversial depending on which 
political practices are being compared. For example, Gaus and Vallier deny symmetry with respect to the practices 
of proposing a law and rejecting a proposed law (2009, p. 64). See Boettcher’s criticism of the asymmetric 
convergence model (2015) and Vallier’s reply (2016). 
29
 Vallier, for example, characterizes models of public reason that incorporate an accessibility requirement as weak 
consensus models. Moreover, he explicitly states that one defining feature of convergence models is that they entail 
a rejection of any accessibility requirement (Vallier 2011b, p. 263). 
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there is nothing that dictates that if one employs an accessibility requirement, then one must be a 
consensus theorist. One plausible explanation of why the accessibility requirement has typically 
been attached to consensus theories is that some consensus theorists may believe that the 
accessibility requirement would block all religious reasons from entering into public 
justification. As Vallier has noted, “the accessibility requirement was practically crafted with 
religious reasons in mind” (Vallier 2011a, p. 385).30 This has perhaps led some to think of the 
accessibility requirement as being necessarily linked to consensus theories. Vallier, for example, 
says that “[w]ithout accessibility, public reason will lean towards “convergence” conceptions of 
public reason…” (p. 389). But as I have stressed, the accessibility requirement can be 
incorporated into convergence models of public reason. I refer to such models as soft 
convergence models of public reason. 
As I construe the term, accessibility incorporates the notion of adequacy. As Robert Audi 
writes, “[a]n adequate reason (for something) is one that, in rough terms, evidentially justifies 
the belief, act, or other element it supports. We might also say that adequacy implies that an 
action or belief based on the reason is thereby rational” (2011, pp. 67-68). Audi proceeds to say 
that an adequate reason must “be in a certain way accessible to rational adults: roughly, 
appraisable by them through using natural reason in the light of facts to which they have access 
on the basis of exercising their natural rational capacities” (2011, p. 70). In other words, 
adequate (or justificatory) reasons must pass agent-neutral evaluative criteria. I have described 
such criteria in terms of shared evaluative standards. 
                                                          
30
 It must be remembered, however, that religious reasons are not the only class of non-public reasons affected by a 
PRO restriction. Any reasons that are grounded in comprehensive doctrines – whether religious or not – are 
impacted by the PRO restriction. 
22 
 
The consequences of not accepting at least a minimalist accessibility requirement are 
high: in the absence of such a requirement, defeater reasons will be radically unconstrained. For 
this reason, I take the issue about what degree of accessibility is most appropriate to be a 
fundamental aspect of the on-going debate not just between consensus and convergence 
theorists, but amongst convergence theorists. 
Regarding the issue of defeaters, it is important to note that a justified reason is not a 
sufficient reason (and hence, not an undefeated reason). As such, even if a reason is accessible, it 
might well be defeated by a weightier accessible reason.31 So, the accessibility requirement 
merely places a constraint on which reasons may be considered justificatory reasons. To re-
emphasize, such reasons need not be available to actual agents, but only to their moderately 
idealized counterparts.  
It might be objected that the view presented here is engaging in a bit of rhetoric by 
conveniently associating the accessibility requirement with rationality or reasonableness. This is 
a result of speaking about the accessibility requirement in terms of the notion of adequacy. When 
we deliberate about whether reason R evidentially justifies some belief or action, we are 
deliberating about whether R satisfies some evaluative standards – whatever those standards may 
be. There may be a temptation, then, to go further and label that which satisfies such standards as 
“reasonable” or “rational.” This is not problematic so long as we avoid extracting our evaluative 
standards from antecedent assumptions about what is reasonable or rational. As such, I make no 
assumptions here as to what sorts of appeals would be ruled out by an accessibility requirement. 
For example, I do not assume that an accessibility requirement will constrain all religious 
                                                          
31
 It is of course the case that disagreement will arise regarding, for example, whether a reason R1 in fact defeats 
reason R2. As Audi notes, clearly articulating degrees of adequacy or justification is a complicated matter, but it is 
doubtful that any plausible political theory can dispense with the idea that there are varying degrees of adequate 
reasons (2011, p. 68). 
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reasons. Nor do I assume that any religious reasons will be vindicated.32 Such issues must be the 
subject of on-going debates about whether such appeals are adequate to evidentially justify the 
claims, actions, or policies, they are intended to support. What is of crucial importance is that the 
accessibility requirement applies equally to religious reasons, and other non-public reasons, as 
well as public reasons.33 At the end of the day, what matters is whether our reasons (and the 
beliefs they are based on) are well-grounded.34 
Part of settling debates about the role of religious reasons will require putting extensive 
effort into better clarifying and defining the notion of shared evaluative standards that is essential 
to the notion of accessibility. Viewed as such, the issue of how to best characterize the 
relationship between a sufficient reason and an individual member of the public is an issue that 
must draw from working theories of rationality. To gain traction on many of the outstanding 
issues in political philosophy (and ethics more generally), we must further confront the problem 
of how to best distinguishing between “good” and “bad” reasons.” This is no easy task, but it is a 
problem that profoundly impacts the vast majority of ethical and political theories. 
                                                          
32
 Vallier argues that an accessibility requirement would vindicate at least some religious reasons. For example, he 
believes that an accessibility requirement would affirm an anti-abortionist argument that relies both on the existence 
of God as well as the idea that ‘God gives each human body a soul that provides a human life with intrinsic worth’ 
(2014, 114). However, while Vallier assumes such an argument will be epistemically justified, he says very little 
about what shared evaluative standards might be incorporated into an accessibility requirement. At times, Vallier 
appears to imply that if a belief is rationally grounded – i.e., it is grounded on some reason – then it qualifies as 
accessible. If this is the intended implication, it would ignore that an accessibility requirement may incorporate 
standards of evidence which govern belief formations. Until these standards are further clarified, it makes little sense 
to claim that belief in things like God-given souls will be vindicated by the accessibility requirement. 
33
 As Eberle stresses, religious believers are understandably critical of “wholesale restrictions on the justificatory 
role of religion, even religion that is manifestly liberal. Such wholesale restrictions will inevitably be objectionably 
arbitrary, because some religious convictions are no different in any normatively relevant respect than some of the 
claims on which some morally necessary coercive laws rely” (2011, p. 292). 
34
 James Boettcher remarks that “[i]f it turns out that some religious beliefs are accessible and ultimately separable 
from religious comprehensive doctrine, so be it. Religious premises would be to that extent permissibly included in 
political justifications” (2015, p. 200). Boettcher’s position is a step in the right direction. However, unlike the view 
outlined here, Boettcher endorses a PRO restriction which makes it unlikely that many religious beliefs will qualify 
as justificatory reasons. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
I have focused on the case of citizens who are not official agents of the state. Specifically, I am 
concerned with whether citizens fail to respect each other when they either agree to or advocate 
for coercive laws on the basis of reasons that others may not be able to accept. In doing so, I 
have adopted a particular form of pubic reason liberalism. To see this, let us distinguish between 
two modes of public reason. The first mode is what I will call top-down public reason. On this 
mode, “decisions regarding constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice should be 
decided by political authorities… (Freeman 2007, p. 329). In other words, it is up to public 
officials to determine which laws satisfy the requirement of public justification. This mode of 
public reason can be contrasted with bottom-up public reason, in which ordinary citizens express 
their preferences – e.g., through voting – in order to determine whether a proposed law satisfies 
the requirement of public justification. The difference between the two modes is important. On 
the top-down mode, public officials are the ones to decide whether individual citizens have 
sufficient reason to agree to a proposal. On the bottom-up mode, it is the citizens themselves (or 
perhaps we should say their suitably-idealized counterparts) that determine whether they have a 
sufficient reason to agree to a proposal. 
It may well be the case that the epistemic or normative constraints that one places on the 
political practice of proposing a law will depend on which mode of public reason is under 
discussion. If public reason liberalism is meant to be nothing more than a decision procedure for 
public officials to follow – i.e., purely a matter of top-down public reason – then one might 
plausibly argue that public officials should be confined to speaking only in terms of public 
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reasons (Freeman 2007, p. 386; Rawls 1996, p. 216).35 After all, perhaps the most practically 
expedient way to satisfy the requirement of public justification, as a public official, is to appeal 
only to political values that all citizens would accept. For if officials propose a law that can be 
justified only on the basis of comprehensive reasons, it is extremely likely that at least one 
citizen will have a different, but reasonable, comprehensive view which serves as grounds to 
reject the proposal.36 Importantly, I leave open the issue of whether an appeal to practical 
expediency could help to normatively justify a PRO restriction on a top-down account of public 
reason. 
This qualification aside, I have argued against the claim that citizens fail to respect one 
another when they advocate for coercive laws on the basis of non-public (but genuine) reasons. 
Because of this, I have rejected the call for a public-reason-only restriction. However, I have 
maintained that public reason liberals should remain committed to an accessibility requirement 
that is framed in terms of shared (agent-neutral) evaluative standards. The resulting view 
occupies a viable middle ground between the consensus and convergence models of public 
reason that have recently been proposed.37 
                                                          
35
 For a discussion of how the constraints on legislators might be seen as more (normatively) demanding than that of 
citizens, see Gaus (2010, p. 29ff) and North (2012, p 188ff.). 
36
 An account of public reason liberalism need not incorporate only a single mode of public reason. But each mode 
evokes different challenges. For example, if public officials engaged in top-down public reason are to appeal only to 
political values that all would accept, then they must be able to specify what the relevant political values are in order 
to know what public reasons there are – and they must be able to do this without relying on any comprehensive 
doctrines. But this may prove to be an overly-difficult task. Alternatively, while on the bottom-up mode of public 
reason it is citizens, and not officials, who ultimately determine whether a law is publicly justified, it remains to be 
seen how one can square the practice of idealization (even moderate) with the practice of voting. Public reason 
liberals are generally concerned with the reasons that citizens can be said to have, not the reasons they actually have. 
But if voting is a means of registering one’s actual preferences, it is difficult to see how we are to know that one’s 
vote is based on one’s moderately idealized reasons, and not one’s shortcomings in reasoning. 
37 I would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees at the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for their 
valuable feedback. I am also grateful Eric Mack and Gerald Gaus for their comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. 
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